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Val Gillies
London South Bank University
The election of the Thatcher Government in 1979 is broadly acknowledged as 
marking a pivotal moment in social and economic history. As most theorists 
acknowledge this rise to power was instrumental in ushering in and cementing 
a neoliberal regime that over the course of 30 years transformed global 
politics and society. Thatcher’s infamous proclamation: ‘there is no such thing 
as society…. only the individual and his family’, heralded a new age in which 
economic liberalism came to infuse, shape and contain all aspects of life, 
including our most intimate spheres of existence. ‘Neolibralism’ as a term has 
been put to promiscuous and often reductive use (Hall 2011, Clarke 2008) but 
few can question the radical assault on social values it seeks to describe. 
Principles of individual freedom, independence and personal responsibility, 
stressed alongside a valorisation of the market as the optimal site for 
maximising human wellbeing, have become ingrained in everyday common 
sense (Harvey 2011, Couldry 2011).
The political consequences of the neoliberal project have been well 
documented alongside sophisticated analyses of social and cultural impact. 
However, the extent to which neoliberal ideals have penetrated deep into the 
arena of family relationships is more rarely examined. A critical look back 
across the decades reveals a series of dramatic changes in 
conceptualisations of children and parents, highlighting how a particular kind 
of individualism and economic reasoning have come to reconstitute 
understandings of personhood and relationality. At the centre of these 
profound shifts is a veneration of the ideal capitalist subject as not only self 
serving but also self producing, with everyday practices and even intimate 
relationships reducible to venture, speculation and investment. At the level of 
Government socially embedded lives have become re-imagined as 
disaggregated individual projects to be managed along entrepreneurial lines 
(Rose 1999), with infant development acquiring a new central significance  in 
the production of competent neoliberal selves.
This chapter examines how such individualist modes of thinking came to be 
superimposed onto the essentially social experience of family as part of a 
concerted program to promote childhood investment as an alternative to the 
welfare state. I begin by considering the longstanding politicisation of family 
relations, highlighting the division that opened up between traditional 
conservatives and economic liberals over representations and prescriptions. I 
then explore how neoliberal values came to permeate and colonise the 
apparently radical, progressive critiques and policies pursued through the 
New Labour years. Baring testament to this process is the extent to which 
relational bonds of love and care are now routinely technicalised through the 
instrumental language of parenting skills and proficiencies. In particular I show 
how related themes of children’s wellbeing and protection have been 
appropriated to justify a highly regulatory approach to family policy; eventually 
morphing into a distinct doctrine of ‘early intervention’ under the auspices of 
the current Conservative led Coalition Government. 
Turning to examine early intervention in particular, I explore and detail its 
emergence as new orthodoxy and a political rallying point. Founded on the 
notion that individual parenting practices can be held accountable for 
children’s future life chances, early intervention programs target the family 
relationships of the poor ostensibly to prevent a transmission of deprivation. In 
practice the attribution of limited life chances to ‘sub-optimal’ parenting works 
to personalise and normalise inequality, while simultaneously conveying 
apparent concern for children’s wellbeing. In cementing a broader shift away 
from state support towards a social investment model the principle of
early intervention marks an ideological convergence between traditional 
conservatism and economic liberalism, galvanising a cross party political 
consensus in the process. But as I demonstrate, the currently employed 
doctrine of early intervention is built on sand, propping up old and increasingly 
discredited ideas and policies. 
The old and new politics of family
Long cherished as the bedrock of society by politicians of all hues, family was 
articulated as a central theme by the Thatcher Government in the 1970s. Of 
particular concern was the changing structure and status of family in the wake 
of the so called ‘permissive sixties’ which was portrayed as undermining the 
social fabric. But while the ‘pro-family’ rhetoric’ of Thatcher and successive 
Conservative Governments railed against liberal views on sexuality, marriage 
and childrearing, the libertarian instincts of the party curbed meaningful policy 
incursions into what was regarded at the time as a private sphere lying 
beyond the boundaries of legitimate state intervention. By the 1990s this 
tension in relation to the moral status of family had developed into an 
identifiable fault line among conservatives, dividing those assuming a more 
reactionary position from those adopting a more liberal stance. The Times 
newspaper memorably characterised this in terms of ‘Tory Mods and 
Rockers’, with the former embracing change while the latter cling on to old 
sensibilities and standards1. 
This surfacing rift in the Tory party reflected a much broader political and 
cultural dynamic operating through the 1970s and 80s. The previously 
cherished ideal of the nuclear family came under sustained attack from 
feminists and others amidst rising rates of divorce, cohabitation and birth 
outside of marriage. A critical lexicon emerged to highlight the repression of 
personal freedom and individuality associated with traditional family ideology. 
Public/ private distinctions depicting families as independent units separate 
from the state were powerfully challenged by feminists, ushering in a new 
appreciation of the ‘personal as political’. While most on the political right 
1
 See The Times, leader ‘Mods and Rockers ,6th July 1998
fiercely opposed such critiques, regarding them as deeply threatening to 
civilised moral values, feminists found unlikely allies in a concentrated strand 
of neoliberal thinking that was wielding increasing power and influence. 
Individualistic, economic centric values began to be articulated through a 
strategic and opportunistic engagement with feminist and new left egalitarian 
critiques (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Fraser, 2009). Family as collective, 
structured experience was problematized as belonging to an old order, paving 
the way for a new emphasis on the personal as the key constituent of social 
life.
Such ideas were echoed and to some extent crafted by prominent sociological 
theorists in the 1990s who hailed the emergence of a new social order of 
‘reflexive modernity’ transforming the experience of family (Giddens 
1991,1992, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, 2002). A post traditional society 
was posited in which men and women, progressively freed from the roles and 
constraints associated with traditional social ties, are compelled reflexively to 
create their selves through day-to-day decisions. According to Anthony 
Giddens our fundamentally altered experience of love, sexuality and 
relationality rendered family a ‘shell institution’: ‘The outer shell remains, but 
inside they have changed’ (Giddens 1999: 19). Drawing on Gidden’s work in 
the 1990s New Labour politicians set about developing their ‘third way’ 
approach, aiming to balance individual rights with social responsibility through 
an emphasis on both moral tolerance and personal obligation. The primary 
role accorded to family as the protector of civilisation was preserved in this 
account, but significantly through a focus on children as its principle 
constituents. Definitions of family structure became more flexible and 
inclusive, crucially through a centring of childrearing as the primary moral 
concern.
A year after the election of the first New Labour Government Giddens 
famously proclaimed ‘There is only one story to tell about the family today, 
and that is of democracy. (1998p. 93). This somewhat optimistic proclamation 
obscured the process by which trenchant critiques of ‘the family’ had been co-
opted to propagate an advancing neoliberal ethos (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2005; Fraser, 2009). As Nancy Fraser (2009) argues feminist emancipatory 
ideals were appropriated and made mainstream achieving very different 
political ends from those intended. The concept of the personal as political 
increasingly became articulated as the personal is the only political, enforced 
through promotion of the self determining, networked individual, liberated from 
gendered and classed expectations and ties. Children came to assume a 
much greater significance within a market based ethic as human capital 
requiring extensive investment to secure their futures as productive citizens. 
To be more explicit, under the remit of New Labour, the institution of family 
was actively re-constructed to embrace an ideology better suited to advanced 
capitalist values. In the modern ‘democratised family’ women are freed up to 
enter the labour market alongside men, replacing male breadwinner models of 
family with norms around dual earning households. Articulated through a 
discourse of gender justice, flexible capitalism is promoted as the progressive 
solution to women’s inequality. The reality was a concentration of women in 
low wage, insecure employment, and an overall decline in living standards 
despite steep rises in hours worked per household (Fraser 2009). Meanwhile 
the female dominated practice of childcare was redrawn as a motor of 
meritocracy, moving conceptualisations of family away from traditional 
structural associations with class bound trajectories. Instead family is hailed 
as the formative site through which competent personhood is cultivated, with 
well parented children better able to navigate and capitalise on new post-
industrial economic landscapes (Gillies 2012, 2005).  
The ‘child centred’ age 
Thus, while the concept of family has retained its political purchase over the 
years, is a distinctly different entity conjured up in rhetoric and policy today. 
Thatcher’s preoccupation with ‘family values’ and strengthening the traditional 
nuclear family have largely been replaced by a focus on ‘parenting’ and the 
‘wellbeing’ of the child. Family is now represented less as a haven in a 
heartless world and more as an individual project and an essential cipher 
through which moral responsibility must be seen to be exercised. A key 
feature of this new public politics of family is the way in which attention has 
moved away from concerns with family structure and function, towards an 
emphasis on knowledge and proficiency. More specifically, governments have 
come to see families in terms of their practices, with a particular focus on the 
minutia of childrearing translating into an ideology of family competence 
(Gillies 2011). As part of this shift parents are depicted as the architects of 
family while children occupy a new status and significance as its core subject.
Moreover, such changes are tied to a characteristically neoliberal 
individualisation and dismemberment of family as an inherently collective 
endeavour. Children, as the nucleus of family are accorded general needs 
and rights which position their interests in isolation from their family members. 
As distinct, separately conceived beings, children are attached to families 
primarily through contingent relationships with their parents. In the process 
family becomes construed as an intrinsically precarious location for children 
as vulnerable and less powerful individuals, and the issue of child abuse 
perpetrated by parents and carers takes on increased significance (Parton 
2006). In particular, attention is deflected away from broader structural and 
economic risks facing families, with the principle source of threat to children’s 
wellbeing associated with the conduct of relationships within families and 
communities.  
In the ‘democratised family’ children are accorded much greater autonomy 
and standing than in the past, reflecting a significant shift in public 
understandings of children’s capacities and welfare needs (Gillies and 
Edwards 2013). Over the course of the last three decades child centred 
discourse has filtered into public policy profoundly shaping legislation and 
practice. The Children Act 1989 was a particular landmark with its focus on 
supporting children’s self determination within legal frameworks and 
prioritising their welfare. Values emphasising autonomy, choice and 
democracy have been similarly embraced as part of a broad take up of a 
discourse of ‘children’s rights’. Legislation enacted as part of the Children Act 
2004 also saw the implementation of the Every Child Matters framework to 
protect and foster children’s well being. This included the introduction of a 
‘Children’s Commissioner to promote awareness of the views, voices and 
interests of children.
This child centred shift coincided with broader concerns that the UK was 
witnessing a ‘crisis’ of childhood (Lee 2001, Kehily 2009, Parton 2004). 
Reports, books and even a newspaper campaign2 appeared alleging that 
British children are exceptionally troubled (UNICEF 2007; Palmer 2006 Gilbert 
et al 2008; Layard and Dunn 2009). Anxiety has coalesced in particular 
around the state of children’s mental health, with claims made that one in ten 
suffer from a diagnosable disorder (Mental Health Foundation, 2005). As 
Harry Hendrick (2003) notes policy constructions of children across the last 
100 years have been characterised by a mind body continuum, with particular 
historical periods emphasising one or the other. Hendrick cites a bodily 
preoccupation with health and hygiene in the early part of the last century 
overtaken by a post war concern with psychological attachment, which shifted 
to a focus on physical abuse and ‘battered baby syndrome’ in the 1970s. 
Arguably the 1990s saw another pendulum swing towards a relatively 
disembodied conception of children’s emotional wellbeing (or perceived lack 
of it). 
Despite its potentially extensive scope children’s wellbeing is addressed as a 
curiously self contained state of mind in much current literature. For example, 
‘The Good Childhood Enquiry’, a highly publicised series of reports by the 
Children’s Society, seeks to centre notions of wellbeing and positivity through 
an account of the potential consequences of contemporary children’s 
unhappiness. In attempting to ‘describe the state of children's well-being in the 
UK today’ the report reifies the concept treating it as an indicator in its own 
right. Lack of wellbeing is framed as the principal cause of problems, rather 
than as a symptom of adverse circumstances. As the following quote from the 
2012 report demonstrates, wellbeing as a state of mind becomes the primary 
focus for change.
Low well-being could be an important indicator of longer-term 
repercussions in people’s lives. If this is the case then focusing on 
subjective well-being, and particularly on children who experience low 
well-being, offers opportunities for early intervention which could 
substantially improve these children’s life chances (The Children’s 
Society, 2012, 6)
Defined as an entirely subjective experience, and routinely measured 
separately from other contextualising factors, wellbeing encompasses notions 
of resilience to adversity ensuring children who struggle with poverty and 
other life stressors can be viewed as psychologically troubled, rather than just 
poor or overburdened. Parenting is accorded the primary role in laying the 
foundations for this mental buoyancy, reflecting the central significance 
childrearing has come to occupy in the new politics of family.
2
 See Daily Telegraph Campaign to Halt the ‘Death of Childhood’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/yourview/1528718/Daily-Telegraph-campaign-to-halt-death-of-
childhood.html#
The rise of parental determinism
As has been noted, traditional conceptions of ‘the family’ were characterised 
by a strongly bounded notion of privacy. The intimate features of family life, 
including parent child relationships were generally positioned as outside the 
remit of state involvement in all but extreme circumstances. The advent of the 
New Labour Government marked a very different approach communicated 
through an emphasis on the importance of children and their development. 
Family, it was suggested, must be re-positioned in the collective imagination 
as a public rather than a private concern. A powerful moral argument was 
fashioned on the grounds of promoting both social order and justice, with 
parenting portrayed as holding the key to a safer and fairer society. This relied 
on a common sense framing of parenting as a ‘skill’ that must be learnt. 
Detached from any appreciation of structural context, culture or values, good 
parenting was presented as set of neutral and natural techniques. Upskilling 
parents, it was claimed, could reduce crime, anti-social behaviour and poverty 
whilst increasing the social mobility and life chances of poor children.  
Following this reasoning the state has a responsibility to regulate and enforce 
good parenting for the sake of the nation and its vulnerable children. New 
guiding policy principles of prevention and early intervention began to take 
shape. 
As many have pointed out deprivation has long been depicted as a condition 
inherited through families lines (Townsend 1979, Walker 1996,Welshman 
2006) Nikolas Rose (1989) has documented how 19th century philanthropists 
identified the family as a potential prophylactic against a perceived dangerous 
immorality exhibited by the growing urban poor. By the 20th century 
evolutionary biology was inspiring genetic accounts of social ills expressed 
through anxieties about dysfunctional households passing degeneracy down 
through the generations (Welshman 2006). Eugenic inflected preoccupations 
with ‘problem families’ and their pathologies dominated welfare and public 
health agendas until the 1960s when they were overtaken by social 
deterministic explanations (Starkey 2000). Poor families remained in the 
frame, but were accused instead of sharing and reproducing lifestyles and 
values that set them apart from mainstream society, thereby perpetuating a 
‘cycle of deprivation’. Popular with successive conservative Governments, 
theorising about inherited disadvantage and the existence of an underclass 
eventually fell out of favour when, despite concerted efforts, research 
consistently failed to establish links between poverty and cultural deficit 
(Atkinson et al 1983, Morris 1994).
New Labour, however, set about repackaging the old and discredited 
preoccupation with transmitted deprivation, presenting it as a progressive, 
liberal concern with tacking inequality and supporting the poor. Partly this was 
achieved through coupling parenting interventions with tangible support like 
tax credits to address family hardship. New Labour’s flagship nationwide 
policy initiative ‘Sure Start’ provided subsidised childcare, toy libraries, cafes 
and drop in groups alongside more didactic attempts to regulate parenting 
practice through classes and explicit advice. Much needed practical and 
financial assistance for parents was delivered through an impassioned 
commitment to invest in children’s future, papering over the moral and political 
objections provoked by previous cultural deficit models. The promise of 
identifying and immediately addressing family based risks to children’s future 
outcomes proved to be a deeply appealing idea, communicated through an 
almost evangelical faith in the power of good parenting to compensate for 
social disadvantage.
But far from representing a timeless, universal skillset, a very particular 
understanding of good parenting evolved to embody this highly politicised 
investment in children’s development. Stephen Brown (1990) mapped the 
beginning of this process, coining the term ‘parentocracy’ to describe how in 
the arena of education an emerging commitment to the ‘wealth and wishes of 
parents’ was displacing more traditional concerns with children’s abilities and 
potential. Introduced by a Conservative Government in the 1980s, parental 
choice in education was promoted as mechanism for better meeting needs 
and driving up standards, with little consideration given to the deeply uneven 
territory from which such ‘choices’ are made (Ball 2008). This consumerist 
framework expanded under the auspices of New Labour, extending deep into 
the arena of childrearing itself. Good parenting became associated with 
choosing, accessing and continuously evaluating products and services (food, 
toys, childcare, parenting advice etc.). 
The ideology of ‘parentocracy’ also imposes a distinct moral agenda that 
naturalises individualism, competition and self interest. Good parents are 
expected to fight tooth and nail to ensure their children succeed, even if this is 
at the expense of others (Reay et al 2011). This competitive imperative is 
endorsed through a normative promotion of ‘intensive parenting’, most often 
expressed in the form of attentive, child centred mothering (Hays 1996, 
Lupton, 2002, Wall 2010) Deeply gendered and classed in terms of 
sanctioned values and practices, intensive parenting, is closely aligned with 
attachment theory, proposing continuous emotional labour to maximise an 
infant’s social, emotional and cognitive capital. Dependant on middle class 
resources and values, ‘cultivational’ approaches are characterised by the 
active manipulation of social and financial assets to ensure middle class 
advantage is passed down through the generations (Lareau 2003). This 
intensive model of childrearing has been broadly embraced as ‘gold standard’ 
parenting, ensuring class specific family practices now regularly held to 
account for the social and structural positions they reflect.
Troubling families: troublesome evidence
Strategic deployment of simplistic but appealing social justice narratives 
helped reframe childrearing as a job with attached performance indicators. 
However, it was an apparent grounding in ‘evidence’ that provided a 
seemingly unassailable legitimacy to new directions in family policy. New 
Labour’s approach to Government was characterised by a commitment to 
base policy making on evidence rather than ideology. This focus was summed 
up in their 1997 manifesto phrase ‘what counts is what works’. Leaving aside 
the inherently problematic concept of removing ideology from politics, the 
application of this conviction to family policy built on and compounded 
technocratic definitions of parenting. The middle class values underpinning 
sanctioned models of childrearing were enshrined as optimal practice. At a 
public level it became common place to view parenting through an evaluative 
lens as something you either get right or wrong. Increasingly startling claims 
about the transformative powers of particular parenting practices began to 
permeate policy documents and political rhetoric, often marked by the prefix 
‘research has shown’. For example, the following assertions were used and 
recycled in a wide variety of New Labour speeches, reviews and strategy 
papers.
We know from all the research evidence....good parenting in the home 
is more important than anything else in determining children’s 
outcomes. (Margaret Hodge, 2004).
Parents and the home environment they create are the single most 
important factor in shaping their children’s well-being, achievements 
and prospects (Alan Johnson, Department for Education and Skills, 
Foreword to, Every Parent Matters 2007)
Parental interest in a child’s education has four times more influence 
on attainment by age 16 than does socio-economic background (Alan 
Milburn, Unleashing aspiration: Final Report from the Panel on Fair 
Access 2009 p30)
Although such claims were invariably coupled with authoritative looking 
footnotes and references the substance and quality of the evidence cited was 
either distortedly over-interpreted or strikingly flimsy. Many of the attributions 
and citations link Chinese whisper style from policy review to policy review 
until their final source becomes untraceable. For example, Alan Milburn’s 
claim that parenting is ‘four times more influential than socio-economic 
background’ was reproduced on a far reaching scale, and became a ‘factoid’ 
regularly drawn on by local and national policy makers. The stated source for 
the figure (another policy review) makes no mention of it and so the origins of 
this claim remain a mystery. Much emphasis was, and continues to be placed 
on Leon Feinstein’s (2003) secondary analysis of the 1970s birth cohort 
study, which implicates social class in determining the trajectory of children’s 
test scores from the age of 22 to 42 months. While this finding highlights the 
formative significance of class from a very early age any association with 
childrearing is purely speculative given that no measure of parenting was 
included in the data. 
As part of a more general commitment to what was termed ‘evidence based 
policy’ New Labour initiated and encouraged a large body of research with the 
explicit aim of establishing links between parenting interventions and 
improved child outcomes. These included evaluation studies of large 
initiatives like Sure Start, parenting programmes and specific services3. In 
addition, a range of new birth cohort studies were designed to include 
‘measures’ of parenting in order to track and link them to children’s future 
outcomes. The results of this sustained research effort have to date proved 
3
 For example  Family Nurse Partnerships and Family Intervention Projects)
inconclusive, and for proponents advocating parenting interventions as a 
pathway out of poverty, distinctly unhelpful. The introduction of Sure Start in 
particular was tied to grandiose promises that it would reduce poverty and 
social exclusion. Extensive evaluations have provided clear evidence that 
Sure Start benefited poor (and not so poor) families (Churchill 2011) but 
chronic inequality and intergenerational disadvantage remained endemic. In 
the wake of this realisation many branded Sure Start an expensive failure, 
blaming lack of engagement with the neediest parents rather than the 
impossibly unrealistic aims framing the scheme4. 
Well established and longstanding evaluations of US parenting programmes 
yielded equally disappointing results for those looking to family based 
interventions to solve deep rooted social problems. For instance, after four 
decades Head Start, a model programme for the UK Sure Start initiative, 
could only demonstrate modest and temporary differences in children’s school 
performance (Ellsworth and Ames 1998). Similar, transitory boost effects have 
been a characteristic of a wide range of US interventions (See Bruer 1999 for 
a detailed analysis). In addition, British cohort studies have produced mixed 
and contradictory analyses of the impact of parenting practices on children’s 
outcomes across time. While some studies have sought to associate 
‘favourable parenting practices’ with more advanced development at ages 3 
and 5 (Ermisch 2008, Kelly 2011), others focusing on outcomes at age 7 
demonstrate the overwhelming significance of income and maternal education 
above and beyond parenting styles (Dickerson and Popli 2012, Hartas 2011, 
Hartas 2012a). As Demitra Hartas (2012b) states, in stark contrast to 
prevailing policy claims:
Parents, it seems, matter most for who they are (for example, 
educated, capable of accessing resources and services) rather than for 
what they do. This is not to suggest that they shouldn’t bother 
supporting their children’s learning. Their involvement does matter, but 
it cannot be seen as the way to level the playing field for deprived 
children (3)
Early intervention and the scientisation of parenting
Despite the scant evidence, depiction of disadvantage as cultural inheritance 
has remained a central policy tenet through a change of Government to the 
new Conservative led Coalition. Attempts to portray poor families as 
personally responsible for their own hardship have reached new extremes in 
the context of unprecedented cuts to welfare and public spending pursued in 
the name of austerity. The Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg asserted that 
‘parenting not poverty shapes a child’s destiny5’. The Prime Minister, David 
Cameron expressed similar sentiments claiming ‘what matters most to a 
child’s life chances is not the wealth of their upbringing but the warmth of their 
4See for example, Jill Kirby: It's time for the Government to admit that Sure Start has been an 
expensive failure http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thecolumnists/2012/07/ts-time-for-the-
government-to-admit-that-sure-start-has-been-an-expensive-failure-.html
5
 Nick Clegg, Speech on Social Mobility, 18 Aug 2010. Transcript available at 
www.libdems.org.uk/press_releases_detail.aspx?title=Nick_Clegg_delivers_speech_on_social_mobilit
y&pPK=38cf9a88-0577-403e-9dcb-50b8e30ed119
parenting6’. Behind this overblown political rhetoric lay subtle yet significant 
shifts in family policy. 
The spectacle of powerful, privileged, white males with public school 
backgrounds briskly dismissing the relevance of class in determining life 
chances stretched credibility and highlighted the need for a more robust hook 
to hang parental determinism on. More significantly, a continued troubling of 
families had to be articulated through the Coalition’s ideological narrative 
stressing the need to shrink the state through increasing personal 
responsibility. New Labour’s preoccupation with family relationships had 
underpinned a huge expansion of state and third sector services aiming to 
support parenting. The Coalition’s rise to power was driven by a very different 
austerity agenda pursued under the pretext of a global financial crisis. Plans 
to slash welfare and state spending were announced immediately and much 
of the previous Government’s investments were dismissed as wasteful, 
ineffective and symptomatic of a ‘nanny state’ degrading personal 
responsibility (Gillies 2012).
The Coalition Government remained invested in attributing social ills to poor 
parenting, but while simultaneously presiding over savage cuts to family 
services. To square this circle, policy makers looked to the US and an 
increasingly influential body of literature promoting heavily scientised 
interpretations of child development. In particular, it was claimed that 
advances in neuroscience could provide incontrovertible evidence of the 
formative impact of parenting in the first years after birth. This concept 
facilitated and bolstered a very specific focus on early years intervention as an 
evidenced, boundaried and cost limited policy approach. Reports and reviews 
set about detailing the apparent physical damage inadequate parenting inflicts 
on infant brains, with the poorest in society implicated as most at risk (Wastell 
and White 2012). UK policy makers and politicians seized on this literature as 
hard evidence of the need to target initiatives more effectively at very deprived 
mothers of young children.
A government commissioned independent review into early childhood 
intervention conducted by Graham Allen (2011a&b) played a particularly 
formative role in fostering and promoting this biologised policy direction. In a 
series of two reports Allen details near miraculous social and economic 
benefits that he claims are achievable through targeting the families of socially 
disadvantaged under three year olds. To the fore of Allen’s account is a claim 
that children develop faulty ‘brain architecture’ if they receive sub-optimal 
nurturing. This point is conveyed graphically, with the front cover of both his 
reports featuring brain scan images of children. An image branded ‘normal’ is 
placed next to a smaller atrophied brain that has been labelled ‘extreme 
neglect’. The origins of this powerful visual statement betray the shaky grip on 
science displayed throughout the reports. The images, in fact, derive from an 
article in a short lived, scientifically dubious journal7, which considered the 
severe physical neglect and sensory deprivation experienced by Romanian 
6
 David Cameron: Supporting Families Speech 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/01/David_Cameron_Supporting_parents.aspx
7
 See Wastell and White (2012) for a more detailed discussion.
orphans after the fall of the Communist Government in the late 80s. The 
sampled article itself is of remarkably poor quality, providing next to no details 
of the methodology pursued or of the clinical histories of the children scanned 
(Wastell and White 2012). 
Leaving aside Allen’s reliance on unsubstantiated research, there is no 
explanation of where the continuity might lie between infants experiencing 
malnourishment, disease and minimal human contact, and mothers failing to 
properly ‘attune’ to children’s emotional needs (40). In their extensive critique 
of current policy directions Wastell and White (2012) carefully and 
systematically dismantle the claims about brain damage that pepper Allen’s 
work, showing how he misunderstands and misrepresents the science. 
Nevertheless, enthusiastic endorsements of the role neuroscience can play in 
developing and targeting parenting interventions have profoundly impacted on 
the public imagination. Politicians, policy makers, health practitioners and 
social commentators from across the political spectrum have drawn heavily on 
the notion that the first 3 years represent a critical period for brain 
development. As the following quotes demonstrate the implications reach far 
beyond early years provision:
We know that there are specific changes that occur in a child’s brain in 
the earliest years of its life that have a disproportionate impact on that 
child’s fate; on that child’s capacity to be able to make the right choices 
and avoid the wrong temptations' (Michael Gove,8 2011).
For far too many people in society crime began before they were born. 
….neuroscience demonstrates that the damage that we start children 
with, is damage that they keep…. We now know that we can pretty 
much figure out where an 18-year-old will be at the time that they are 
two and a half or three years old…there are of course physical signs, 
including the scale and size and capacity of their brains to be able to 
deal with challenges
(Ian Duncan Smith, 20109) 
Research has for decades kept proving that, by the age of three, a 
child's destiny is all but sealed by how much affection, conversation, 
reading and explaining they have received. Getting no love and no 
language relegates them to a lesser life. Recent research from the 
University of Pennsylvania scanned children's brains over 20 years and 
found cognitive stimulation by the age of four was the key factor in 
developing the cortex, predicting cognitive ability 15 years later. That 
shows how brief is the window of opportunity for changing lives (Polly 
Tonybee 201210).
8
 See http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/speeches/a00199946/michael-gove-speaks-to-
the-london-early-years-foundation-about-the-importance-of-early-years
9
 See Speech to Centre for Social Justice – see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/09/iain-duncan-smith-childrens-brains
10
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/18/tory-dogma-cut-price-baby-
farming
The sad part of the increased knowledge about baby brain 
development is that it is clear that the way hardwiring consolidates the 
connections makes it very hard to undo or "rewire” (NHS parenting 
program, The Solihull Approach11)
The strident tone of these claims implies the existence of a clear cut robust 
body of scientific evidence, belying the altogether more troubling reality. In an 
illuminating and detailed study John Bruer (1999, 2011) has documented the 
rise of such deterministic discourses in a US context, highlighting their 
divergence from neuroscience as an emerging discipline. As a high profile 
cognitive scientist, Bruer described his increasing bemusement on hearing 
and reading about breakthroughs in brain science that promised to 
revolutionise child care policy. In an effort to trace the sources of such 
apparent breakthroughs he found no new science, just a selective, 
oversimplified and over generalised re-appropriation of longstanding studies. 
Significantly, he reveals how such claims derived from policy and advocacy 
circles rather than the scientific community, largely driven by philanthropists in 
a well-meaning but misleading campaign to re-validate parenting support 
initiatives like Head Start. As Bruer notes:
Neuroscience was chosen as the scientific vehicle for the public 
relations campaign to promote early childhood programs more for 
rhetorical, than scientific reasons (Bruer 2011, 2)
The seductive allure that brain scans, can exert over the general public has 
been well documented, particularly in terms of the capacity of brain images to 
authenticate explanations that would otherwise lack plausibility (McCabe and 
Castel 2008, Skolnick Weisberg et al 2008).This potent effect has not been 
lost on UK policy makers, think tanks and voluntary organisations, with such 
images liberally disseminated alongside impassioned entreaties to fund early 
intervention. As in the US, UK neuroscientists themselves have had notably 
little engagement in the translation and interpretation of their work. In fact, in 
direct contrast to the early intervention message, advances in the field of 
neuroscience continue to highlight the enduring adaptability and plasticity of 
the brain (Royal Society, 2011a & b; Rutter, 2007). 
The retreat of contemporary policy makers into biological determinism and the 
flagrant misuse of science this entails bears an uncomfortable but striking 
resemblance to the rise of eugenics in the 20th century. In line with the 
eugenics movement in its time, brain science and early intervention 
proponents receive much of their funding from wealthy philanthropists, regard 
negative traits and weakness to be rooted in the lower orders and are exerting 
a powerful influence over welfare and public health agendas. While brain 
development has replaced the concept of genetic weakness the alleged 
consequences of a lack of timely intervention are almost as immutable. The 
‘prime window’ for development is estimated at 18 months (plus the prenatal 
11
 Solihull NHS Care Trust (2011) The Solihull Approach Resource Pack, Cambridge: Jill Rogers 
Associates.
period), beyond which deficits are portrayed as increasingly harder to 
overcome. 
Yet, for the time being a heavily biologised narrative of early intervention 
retains a progressive aura. Positive values of social investment and moral 
necessity are stressed, with early intervention portrayed as an unquestionable 
social good. As Brid Featherstone and colleagues (forthcoming) point out 
critical analysis is hindered by general apprehension about the survival of 
state services in the context of austerity. This silence is further bolstered by 
the emotionally-potent vision of children as perceived victims of neglect, 
making early intervention difficult to question without appearing to position 
oneself against children’s wellbeing. But while presented as a discrete, time 
limited inoculation against the incubation of poverty, the ideological 
underpinning of early intervention obscures the worsening hardship framing 
the lives of poor families in the current climate. Disadvantaged mothers might 
now receive training in parenting skills, but their prospects of securing decent 
housing, an income sufficient to feed their children and access to desperately 
needed support services diminish by the day.
Responsiblilising families and re-traditionalising mothers
Policy appeals to early intervention as a concept are largely conveyed through 
a rhetoric of social munificence and paternalistic concern. Deserving poor 
families are positioned as naturally inclined to self improvement and eager to 
address their personal, emotional and cultural deficits. Any hint of resistance 
to this program of responsibilisation marks a rapid decent into moral 
pronouncement and authoritarian threat. With the rise of family policy under 
New Labour came a creeping encroachment of a criminal justice agenda 
(Pitts 2003). Disadvantaged families were increasingly drawn into judicial 
systems through the design and expansion of a range of legislative acts. Most 
notoriously Parenting Orders were introduced to force parents to attend 
classes and adhere to particular childrearing rules. In addition, record 
numbers of parents (mainly mothers) were prosecuted and jailed for failing to 
prevent their children from truanting.12 A similar hardline approach is to the 
fore of the Coalition Government’s concern with ‘troubled families’ as the 
wellspring of anti-social behaviour. 
Repeated Government pledges to ‘turn around’ the lives of the nation’s most 
troubled families have seen the setting up of a Troubled Families Unit and a 
‘national network of ‘Troubled Family Trouble-Shooters’ overseeing and co-
ordinating interventions on a payment by results system . Struggling families 
are approached as if they were business units requiring rationalisation, 
performance management and heavy handed financial disincentives.  In her 
first report as head of the Troubled Families Unit, Louise Casey peddled 
gratuitous case studies of welfare dependency and child sexual abuse as if 
representative of a wider ‘dysfunctional’ rump of troubled families, detailing 
immorality, incompetence, ignorance and lack of aspiration. Related policy 
proposals have included limiting child related benefits to two children to 
12
   Figures released by the Ministry of Justice following a freedom of information request in 2011 see 
Truancy laws caught 12,000 parents last year , The Guardian, Tuesday 8 November 2011 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/nov/08/truancy-parents-12000-prosecutions
ensure the poor ‘cut their cloth in accordance with their capabilities and 
finances’13 and welfare payments administered through cards that restrict 
purchases to so called ‘priority items’ to guard against the spending of public 
money on alcohol or cigarettes14.
A discourse of early intervention to some extent sugar coats this ruthless drive 
to regulate and responsiblise poor families. It goes beyond the harsh rhetoric 
associated with accounts of an amoral underclass to offer a government 
sponsored road to redemption. Disadvantaged parents are pathologised and 
blamed but ostensibly to receive help for the sake of their children. From this 
perspective only the morally reprehensible would eschew an opportunity to 
become a better parent and transform their children’s lives. This appeal to self
discipline can also be seen as marking a crucial political pivot point, marrying 
neoliberal sensibilities with more traditional conservativism.  Libertarian values 
intersect with moral authoritarianism through a shared commitment to 
discipline the poor so they become able to embrace and manage themselves 
appropriately. This approach exemplifies a form of ‘neoliberal paternalism’ 
(Soss et al 2011), with good citizenship reduced to self care and individual 
responsibility. State involvement in the sphere of the personal is justified on 
the grounds of ensuring the production of competent neoliberal subjects 
capable of managing their freedom. 
In this particular manifestation of neoliberal paternalism longstanding 
conservative ideals are appeased through a re-inscription of traditionalised 
and heavily gendered family roles. While couched in the gender neutral 
terminology of ‘parenting’ early intervention is almost exclusively targeted at 
mothers as the core mediators of their children’s development. Old and highly 
contentious tenets of attachment theory are reinvoked and embellished with 
brain science to emphasise the primacy of mother child relationships in the 
early years. The gender encoding of early intervention policy has become 
increasingly explicit. Current initiatives are largely directed and delivered 
through pre and postnatal care provision in poor communities via targeted 
parenting education for pregnant women and new mothers. The default, 
language of parenting continues to frame policy literature, but now frequently 
gives way to female pronouns and references to mothers, while fathers 
feature in relation to concerns about discipline and financial maintenance 
(Gillies 2012). 
This invocation of mothering through the gender negating language of 
‘parenting’ results in the worst of both worlds for targeted women. Implicitly 
held to account for their children’s development, the particular challenges and 
disadvantages facing them as women and mothers go unrecognised. They 
13
 See ‘Iain Duncan Smith suggests two-child limit for benefits’ The Telegraph 25 Oct 2012 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9632688/Iain-Duncan-Smith-suggests-two-child-limit-for-
benefits.html
14
 No booze' smart cards for benefit claimants who spend their handouts on drugs and alcohol
Daily Mail 13 October 2012 http://js.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2217101/Iain-Duncan-Smith-No-
booze-smart-cards-benefit-claimants-spend-handouts-drugs-alcohol.html
are to all intents and purposes trapped in an empty policy ethic of sameness 
in a context of ingrained difference and inequality (Haney 2004). The Allen 
review highlights the consequences of this strategic and cynical use of 
genderless concepts of parenting in early intervention discourses.  Most 
notably domestic violence is listed as highly damaging to children’s 
development, while recommended policy solutions centre exclusively on 
enhancing a ‘parent’s’ sensitivity to the child.  Meanwhile funding for domestic 
violence services have been reduced by almost a third ensuring that large 
numbers of women and children are now regularly turned away from refuges 
(Towers and Walby 2012).
 
Challenging orthodoxies: recalibrating the debate
This chapter has offered a critical analysis of family policy as a politicised 
project. Pursued as part of a wider program of economic reform and sold on 
the ticket of individual freedom, democracy and personal empowerment, 
neoliberal strictures have permeated and re-ordered contemporary political 
thinking about families to better fit with market based ethics. The profound 
implications of this for children and parents have been explored to show how 
an apparently enlightened child centred discourse and associated 
championing of children’s wellbeing have concealed narrow and politicised 
conceptions. Dominant developmental perspectives construct children as 
minds in the making, detachable from broader family and material 
circumstances, and acknowledged only through consideration of their future 
capacity to compete in the marketplace. 
A doctrine of early intervention has grown out of this fixation with maximising 
human capital. Initially designed as a practical policy measure to shape and 
support the development of competent neoliberal subjects early intervention 
has come to occupy an increasingly ideological role in the context of 
contemporary austerity politics. Its power operates largely through 
reverberation of rhetoric, stressed in almost inverse proportion to actual 
government investment in programs and initiatives. Funding cuts and 
payment by results schemes have decimated a previously thriving sector of 
‘parenting professionals’. Early intervention as a practice is now targeted 
towards a very small minority of families, while the contentions and distorted 
science framing the doctrine are drawn on more broadly to lend credence to 
the responsiblisation of the poor.
This is not to underplay the significance of such approaches for those caught 
in the cross hairs. Punitive, almost vengeful policy approaches (fines, 
imprisonment, or even care proceedings) can be enacted supposedly to 
protect a child’s psychological wellbeing and development. Crucially concern 
is directed at what children will become rather than what they might be 
experiencing in the here and now. A twisted logic that advocates the docking 
of family benefits for the sake of the child can be articulated through reference 
to future prospects and the spectre of transmitted deprivation. Similarly policy 
debates around child poverty now focus, not on the moral repugnance of such 
a vulnerable group suffering, but on the effects deprivation will have on their 
later life chances. Emphasis on tackling the ‘causes rather than the symptoms 
of  poverty’ ensure that commitments to reduce disadvantage are deferred to 
unspecified dates in the future, chiefly through the expressed intention to 
prevent children from making the same mistakes as their parents. The 
tendency to define children in relation to their futurity is not new (Lee 2002, 
Mayall 2002), but the conceptual dislocation of children from their existent 
material lives has intensified with the rise of the early intervention movement. 
The automatic eliding of children’s best interests with the best interests of 
neoliberal regimes has been particularly effective in masking the brutal impact 
on women and children. The last 30 years have seen levels of inequality and 
child poverty soar15, while the current on-going austerity drive has targeted 
family benefits and children’s services. In the face of a ruthless program of 
cuts families have suffered disproportionately, with lone mothers and their 
children estimated to lose more than any other household type (Green 2013). 
At the same time, the vast majority of Parenting Orders are discharged 
against mothers ensuring women continue to bear the brunt of punitive 
sanctions designed to discipline irresponsible parents (Peters 2012). And 
while the language of children’s rights and wellbeing decorate policy 
commitments, the criminalisation and incarceration of children and young 
people have reached staggering heights, with use of custody for ten to 14-
year-olds rising by 550% since 1996 (Banardos 2008). At a more general 
level, children and young people are subjected to an extraordinary level of 
surveillance and regulation. This ranges from compulsory checks for two year 
olds to ensure they are developing to order, to the extensive and intrusive use 
of CCTV in schools 
As Stuart Hall (2011) notes, this is the neoliberal engine at full throttle, despite 
and perhaps because of the continuing global economic crisis and 
subsequent discrediting of the fundamental ideas propping up economic and 
political orthodoxies. In the context of growing doubts about market based 
rationality as a governing ethic, ruling elites are increasingly blaming the faulty 
psychology of individuals and looking to mechanisms and technology that 
force people to better fit the market model (Davies 2012). Current family 
policy directions reflect this overextension of neoliberal apparatus, to embrace 
highly illiberal, coercive ideals (Parton forthcoming, Davies 2012). An 
advancing capitalist ethos through the 1990s appropriated and apparently 
championed women and children’s rights, but the progressive rhetoric is fast 
wearing thin amid re-traditionalisation narratives, authoritarian policies and 
iniquitous austerity measures. New opportunities are emerging to question 
taken for granted conceptual frameworks and moral sensibilies. Women and 
children must be at the very heart of this recalibration.
15
 See Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Child Poverty in the UK 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/work/workarea/child-poverty
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